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ABSTRACT

Making and marketing arms and weapons technologies provide a test
of neo-realist and market theories of the international system. Neither
adequately explains why states produce and sell arms and lethal technologies~
Both require fundamental revision and integration to account for the
behavior of states in this policy domain.
This paper argues that two systemic imperatives - order and welfare
- determine states' behavior in making and marketing arms. Part one
establishes. the conceptual framework for this proposition and explores the
implications of these imperatives for arms production and transfers, along
with the diffusion of military technology. Part two outlines national
-

-

strategies and organizational arrangements of developed and developing
states in responding to these imperatives, and provides through this tour

d'horizon a provisional evidentiary basis for the argument of part one.

THE POLIDCAL ECONOMY OF MAKING AND MARKETING ARMS:
A TEST FOR THE SYSTEMIC IMPERATIVES OF ORDER AND WELFARE
Edward A. Kolodziej
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign
Frederic S. Pearson
University of Missouri, St. Louis

IN1R0DUCTION
·sketched below is a conceptual framework for the political economy of making and
marketing anns. There now exists a sufficiently large and reliable body of research to
synthesize what we know about the structure and operation of the global political economy of
anns. 1

Such a framework is a precondition for explaining policymakers' behavior and,

obversely, for rationalizing the choices confronting them in their efforts to define efficient ·
and effective strategies for developing and acquiring arms. These strategies can be either
consistent or at odds with a state's over-all political and economic aim:s. The latter,
however, may themselves be competing and incompatible, leading to the .pursuit of individual
strategies which, while consistent, respectively, with the specific aims driving them, may
conflict with each other. The postwar American commitment to liberal economic trade and
investment principles and acceptance of the countervailing principle of member preference
within the European Economic Community, a concession made largely on goo-political
grounds to promote a united Europe to contain the Soviet Union, illustrate compromises that
must often be made between strategic and economic objectives and the mixed and
contradictory strategies that arise from mutually de~irable but essentially irreconcilable aims.
More precise conceptual maps also are needed to identify missing details about why
and how arms and related know-how are producedjand transferred. Proposition testing and
data collection efforts, now underway,2 can be adv,~ced if what we wish to explain, predict,
and control -- why states make and market arms an~ lethal technologies -- is more clearly
defined and delineated. Better maps are especiallypeeded today because of the isolation of
research and policy analysis of arms producti<>n, sales, and coercive technologies from
current thinking about the global political economy. This separation is as surprising as it is
i

unwarranted,3- conforming neither with the expected rational (or at least "satisfi.cing")4
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behavior of policymakers, nor with the discernible and interdependent patterns of nation-state
and market decision-making.
This paper argues that two systemic imperatives -- order and welfare -- determine
states' behavior in making and marketing anns. Part one establishes the conceptual
framework for this proposition and explores the implications of these imperatives for arms
production and transfer, along with the diffusion of military technology. Part two outlines
national strategies and organizational arrangements of developed and developing states in
responding to these imperatives, and provides through this tour d'horizon a provisional
evidentiary basis for the argument of part one. It focuses primarily on factors that can be
generaµzed across states. There is no assumption that these system-wide factors influence
state, governmental, bureaucratic, and corporate behavior with equal weight, nor that they
explain outcomes independently of other levels of analysis and causation. However, these
alternative levels are addressed only indirectly, since the number and complexity of causal
factors preclude extensive discussion here. 5 Conversely, these lower contingent levels of
explanation provide neither a framework to rationalize the discrete political economic
strategies of states nor a basis for generalizing across the behavior of individual .states to
demonstrate that they are a species of a larger genus of behavior. Appeal must be made to
the system-wide factors of order and welfare that condition, albeit variably, the behavior of
all states in the system.
We will proceed on the assumption that an international political economic· system
exists that, when properly defined, explains, partially but cri.tically, why states make and
market anns. 6 Evidence ror this assumption, adduced below, derives simply enough from
the way states and societies go about fashioning anns and threatening to harm., maim, and kill
each other or to destroy or damage each other's values to get their way. Since the actors .
themselves assert these activities to be worthwhile, usually on the basis of "self-defense,"
these coercive activities are considered, for purposes of analysis, as instrumentally rational as
any other object, say,.building skyscrapers, caring for the old, or solving global pollution
problems. Making and marketing arms are an integral part of a nation's political--economic
activities and pwposes and not alien or exogenous to them.

Table 1

INTERNATIONAL ARMS MARKET: ACTORS AND OBJECTIVES
Actors

Objectives

National Actors
Nation-states and
national governmental .authorities

Security, political influence.
economic growth, solvency, full
employment

Subnational Actors
Military organizations

Military security

~dustrial and corporate units

Maximum economic gain -- profits in
marketeconomiesorbudgetary
allocations in controlled economies

Technoscientific centers
(research groups, universities,
institutes)

Service functions for military and
private sector in pursuit of new
knowledge, techniques and products

Governmental bureaucracies

Surveillance and control of other
subnationals

Transnational Actors
Multinationals

Maximum economic gain

Revolutionary movements,
nation-states ,

Political change and new regimes

International Actors
Alliance organizations: NAID, WTO

Offense, defense, deterrence;
collective political influence;
internal management and policing
of dependent states

Economic or political communities
(EC)

Trade and technological
competitiveness; political
influence

World and regional
organizations (UN,
ASEAN, OAU) ·

Regional order and cooperation;
development; arms control

Source: Adapted from Christian Catrina, Arms Transfers and Dependencies (New
York:Taylor and Francis, for UNIDIR, 1988), p. 69.
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I. Order and Welfare: Systemic Imperatives Driving the Malting and Marketing of Arms
1. Defining an Arms Political Economy

The international system within which the global political economy nests is defined
essentially by the military and techno-economic capabilities distributed among
decisionmaking units controlling the allocation of assets.7 These units principally, but not
exclusively, include nation-states and governmental bureaucracies, as well as national and
multinational military, industrial, and financial institutions. · Table 1 summarizes the main
actors and their presumptive objectives. Generally, national political leaders tend to assign in
their public pronouncements secondary importance to techno-economic capabilities relative to
military force and security, while these priorities appear reversed for subnational or
transnational actors. Thus, policymakers reaffirm the conventional, if mi.sguided, distinction
between "low" and "high" politics, a perennial of traditionalist realist thinking unmindful
either of the pressures on governments to produce ever higher levels of material welfare and
of the causal link between techno-economic development and military power. In practice,
however, governments and their ruling elites are compelled increasingly to blur the line
between strategic and political objectives and techno-scienti:fic and economic development.
This process of integrating national security and welfare aims is nowhere more explicit than
in the area of making and marketing arms where governmentally induced and .directed technoscientific and economic development conspire with market forces and incentives to enhance a
nation's material wealth, status, and power.

In arguing the rebuttable proposition that the global economy is less interdependent
today than before the world wars, Kenneth Waltz suggests that market forces today do not
play a determining role in redistributing economic and technological capabilities and,
concomitantly, power among·states: 8 This paper, based on state behavior associated with
arms production and sales~ draws the opposite conclusion. Nation-states and governments
only partially control markets, yet markets both constrain states or provide them opportunities
to advance or preserve their relative power positions. The redistribution of resources among
states through. the market has been and will continue to be decisive in defining the current
state system's hierarchy and each state's power to work its will. Some states, such as the

4

United States and the Soviet Union, may have sufficient resources to pursue highly valued
autarkical policies, but, as Soviet leaders recently have discovered, perhaps only at the
expense of economic growth and development that in the long-run undermine national
power. Autarky may be achieved -- Albania and Burma are suggestive examples-__ but at a
cost of economic retrogression and, not unexpectedly, declining national power and
international legitimacy.
Growing recognition of eroding US and Soviet techno-economic and military
hegemonies,9 occasioned partly by the inexorable extension of an increasingly interdependent

.

.

global economy, prompts a more inclusive definition of the international system than
traditional realist or neo-realist assumptions admit. 10 In focusing on the power implications
for states of market operations, the Marxist-Leninist argument that markets concentrate
political and economic power is still relevant. Less helpful is the linear and strict Marxist
identification of market forces with political and economic exploitation by a particular class.11
The market fosters and facilitates the redistribution of power, but it also yielq.s wealth and ·
welfare as desirable and demanded outcomes of compelling appeal for governments and
peoples beset by economic underdevelopment or pushed by Sait's law of unquenchable
· appetite for more now. The connections between wealth and power are more complex,
diffuse, and obscure than either Marxist or contemporary "free market" scholarship and
theorizing have yet revealed. 12 What is clear is that power and wealth are real forces. They
are associated, respectively, with order and welfare as the systemic determinants of natural
security and a nation's socio-economic policies. The pressure of these determinants and the
quest for power and wealth that they engender prompt the need to enlarge and deepen realist
assumptions about the international system and about the particular incentives driving
national behavior.
To be useful, theories about the international system must empirically relate the.
distribution of military and techno-eco~omic capabilities to the discretionary authority in the·
hands of formal governmental and non-governmental decisionmakers to influence or control
preferred outcomes in conflict with other states whether over geo-political or economic
stakes. Both forms of power explain which nations get their way and, by that token, the
politi~al structure and decisive decisional processes of an international order or polity.

5

Relative to most domestic regimes, international order is imperfect but it no less defines the
basis for a polity or political system as a function of the distribution of material capabilities. 13
There is also reason to reject a sharp and artificial distinction between military and
non-military goods and services and to assume, subject to confirming empirical investigation,
that what may appear to be competing security and welfare policies at a foreign policy level
may be coherent and at least "satisficing" behavior at a systemic level of analysis. In this
sense, arms are tools or implements of security and destruction. These qualities condition the
terms of trade between states and distinguish arms markets from other markets because of
concerns about secrecy, transfers of hostile technologies, and potentially adverse political
impacts of uninhibited commercial exchanges of these lethal products and services. 14 Trade·
in arins is still trade and subject to the laws of economics and markets, however specialized
exchanges in lethality might be. Similar special concerns prevail in other, non-military,
economic sectors, such as computers or bio-technology whose markets are no less shaped by
the products and services traded within them. Arms are then simply goods and services, like
other commercial products, whose value is determined relatively and according to supply and
demand. If arms are produced and another product foregone, their value may be monetized
as an opportunity cost. Treating arms as an instrument of power and as an object of wealth
(viewed as

aproduct of trade or as a "conserver" of the value of labor, capital, and know-

how) permits demand.and supply of these products and services to be evaluated within a·
common international economic and security framework.

In enlarging but limiting our analysis to include objects proper to a political economy
of arms, we inevitably deemphasize, but should not altogether ignore such factors as values
and ideology (religious or secular), social structure, customs, or cultural preferences and
mores. While one may have been able to· predict the basic stalemate of the Iran-Iraq war
through analysis of population, industrial output, and military preparedness, one certainly
could not completely explain the war's outcome or the full implications of the Iranian
revolution and pan-Islamic fundamentalism strictly by analyzing technology or military
prowess. Similarly, it has been argued thata persistent postwar West German tendency to
restrict arms exports to states at war owes much to culture -- to Kantian conceptions of an
ideal world order and Grotian legalism -- as well as to contemporary political concern for the
legitimacy of NAto reliance on nuclear weapons. 15 In view of such multiple causation, a
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balance must be struck between rigor and relevance that surmounts the artificial boundaries
between current political and economic analysis, yet is not so delicate and sensitive that it,
reacts to almost any causal perturbation that could be introduced into the analysis. By
including military and techno-economic capabilities as an integrated theoretical concern, we
will at least lower some of the barriers created by a narrow disciplinary focus on the nation.state. 16 We cah also note the role of law, ideology, and values where relevant. In working
to overcome the isolation of politics and economics, the theorist can better approximate the

assumptions on which governments themselves operate in equilibrating the requirements of
rule and order with wealth and welfare. We also will be forced·to integrate theories of the
state and those of the market.
Making and marketing arms thus falls within the scope of activities understood as
political economy, i.e., that domain of human activity that is the intersection of the pursuit of
political power and purpose with the production of goods and services. These activities are
responses, as in all other forms of political-economic behavior, to two pervasive systemic
imperatives animating state and governmental behavior: order and ·welfare. Order is a
primary problem intrinsic to politics. It arises from the divergent claims and demands made
by individuals, groups, and nations on each other to gain adherence to their preferences.
Order, as a political problem, may be considered under two modes: in fundamentally
valuational and normative terms, as the ancient Greeks, viz., as ordering processes by which
rulers (whether one, the few, or the many) define what is worthwhile from what is not. Or,
order may be val.nationally neutralized as a political.concept as Machiavelli and value-free
modem political theorists and practitioners assume and viewed as the pursuit of power in
which preferences are imposed on others.17 Order, then, is associated either with
widespread and general acceptance of certain shared values or with -instruments of influence,
rules of behavior, and deference to legitimate or effective authority within a political system,
As such, and in the extreme, order may be consensual or coercive. In greater of lesser
measure, most political orders. are an admixture of both elements.
Modem, empirical political science has adopted Machiavelli's perspective. Power is
therefore a central concept Following Robert Dahl, power is "the capacity of A to get B to
do something he would not otherwise do in the.absence of power. "18 In expanded form,
incorporating traditional and modem notions of power, politics is a continuing dialectic of

7

purpose and power about who gets his way about what and how. It includes not only the
basic Hobbesian concern with individual, group, and national security-but also with the
quality of public and private life -- defined critically by regime considerations and the scope
of personal and social freedom, equality, and welfare.
Welfare is a relatively new systemic imperative coincident with the emergence of
commercial capitalism and, later, with industrialization. It is also linked to a widely shared
assumption that the Malthusian doctrine of chronic poverty and penury can be overcome.
Welfare now approaches order as politically primal and, at the very least is a necessary if not
sufficient determinant of thelegitimacy of any modem political order. Welfare also extends to
an overriding concern with the amount and equitable distribution of material wealth enjoyed
by individuals and groups, whether as collective or personal goods and services. Obviously,
welfare no less than order is an ambiguous term whose content is essentially derived from
actor values and behavior and evolving historical circumstances. If one has no material
aspirations, then one is rich. This limiting ascetic case, however, is not the prevailing
preference of populations and of governments today. Nor is the notion of welf~ absolute
since some may be satisfied with less material wealth than others and, indeed, those with
more may believe themselves less well off, depending on prevailing ideological beliefs,
mores, and expectations.
Welfare, however defined, may be associated with order and security, but should not
be equated with it. Meeting material welfare demands does not automatically produce order.
On the other hand, those who feel aggrieved on welfare grounds may revolt against an
existing order and replace it. · Such certainly were some of the most important motivations
underlying the gr~t revoluti~ns of our era, common threads linking the American, French,
Russiru:i, and Chinese upheavals. No state today can ignore welfare imperatives -- even an
explicitly anti-modernist counter-revolutionary movement like that of Iran; no government,
however constituted, can survive without addressing them, whether by creating the
conditions for acquiring more wealth, suppressing these demands through coercion, or
convincing their populations to be satisfied with their material lots.
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2. States and Markets: Implements of Order and Welfare
The human instruments created over the past several centuries to solve, albeit
provisionally, the problems of global order and welfare have been, respectively, the nationstate and the market In ideal or pure form, the incentives and expectations generated by each
social mechanism are fundamentally contradictory. Nation-states claim to be independent
and autonomous, whereas the market theoretically is interdependent and universally
accessible to buyers and sellers. The nation-state allocates resources by command, whether
rendered by authoritarian fiat or democratic consensus, while the regime of the market is
supposed to operate by free choice, guided by the principles of comparative advantage,
governmental nonintervention in market competition, and division of labor to promote the
efficie11t production and distribution of wealth. The nation-state is fundamentally parochial,
atavistic (including national, ethnic, and racial attributes), discriminatory in its secular (e.g.
democratic, authoritarian), religious, or communal orientation (e.g., Islamic, Christian,
Jewish, Hindu), and inclined to protect its entrepreneurs, work force, and citizens against
foreign economic competitors. The market, as a consequence of advances in transportation
and communications, has nowadays a global reach and is purportedly non-discriminatory. In
theory, access and right are attributes of the quality and quantity of the goods and services
l;)eing offered for exchange, and not the seller's or buyer's birthright, social status,
nationality or beliefs.
TeI:itorial boundaries bind the nation-state; unhindered markets ignore.territorial
limits~ Indeed, as the "oil crisis" of 1973showed, nation-state imperatives diverge
significantly from those.of marke.t players -- as when the French and Italian governments
were unable to coerce greater petroleum supplies from their nationalized oil companies than
embargoed states such as the US or the Netherlands could coax from multinational suppliers
rearranging shipments on the high seas. 19 An international society, with the nation-state as
'

.

its principal coercive mechanism to command order, is, by circumstance, a self-help system.
Alone or in concert, the "units are responsible to check the hegemonic pretension of other

units or coalitions. Threats to a unit's existence, power, and status are pervasive whether as
an attribute of the system, as Rousseau argued, 20 or as a circumstance of a particular conflict
with another state, say, the Arab-Israeli or India-Pakistan conflicts. Military capabilities and
diplomacy are the traditional forms of power relied upon to respond to these threats. 21
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Following Boulding,22 international relations, conceived narrowly as limited to
nation-states, can be viewed as a threat system; conversely, the market is, as an ideal model
if not always in practice, an exchange system in which goods and services are ostensibly
traded for mutual benefit free from coercion or threats. Meeting threats against presumably
resourceful and calculating nation-,state opponents creates incentives to withhold and control
information vital to national security and to restrict scientific and technological exchange.
Efficient and fair markets imply over time, a continuous flow of information, scientific
findings, and technological know-how among economic units. A pure threat system is a
zero-sum game. A market can provide for multiple and positive pay-off to all players; all
may gain in their exchanges, although differentially as a function of exertion, talent, natural .
endowments or chance. The nation-state conceives power as command and compellence to
control outcomes; the market defines power in terms of reciprocally satisfying exchanges
between consenting parties.
In the real world it is almost impossible to find either states or markets working in
pure form or independently of each other. Total wars between irreconcilable adversaries,
dedicated to the singular objective of annihilating or subordinating the opponent, are limiting
cases. The Punic and Napoleonic wars or World Wars I and II most closely approximate the
model (if not normatively desirable) condirl:ons of nation--state behavior under severe and
mortal threat So, too, global free markets, exempt from limiting or consensually tolerated
nation-state rules, cannot be found in distilled form. Expansion of Western finance

~

industrial capitalism, the antithes~s of 17th and 18th century mercantilism, did not conform to
pure market practices, as Liberal critics abundantly understood. And contrary to the
expectations of these latter theorists, the economic expansion of 19th century corporate
capitalism relied heavily on the coercive power of the states with which individual firms,
such as Britain's East India Company or Germany's Krupp, were closely associated. These
companies as well as their investments and exports enjoyed protectionist privileges as a byproduct of European imperialism and the creation of a global Eurocentric political system. In
tum, industrial and financial corporate development through the market strengthened the

internal economic and military capabilities of the nation-states.
Threat systems and the globalization of markets under the aegis of state-protected
capitalism also prompted innovations in domestic political and bureaucratic organization.
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Specifically, the general staff arose and, with it, a new class of experts, using

and managing

violence efficiently to employ the new abundance of economic and military capabilities and
human resources available to the state principally, though not exclusively, through the
creativity and exertions of home populations. 23 The Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese
·wars and both world wars were to demonstrate the difficulty of containing expansionist
powers, like Japan and Germany, through such means as multinational congresses, pacts,
. leagues, or regional balances of power once economic growth and internal socio-political
transformation redistributed.nation-state power capabilities throughout the global system.24
The importance of internal and global markets in transforming international power relations
generated incentives for states to rely on and to control market operations. Witness, for
example, Japan's "co-prosperity sphere" to rationalize its Asian imperial expansion.

If the market was itself a powerful instrument for producing material power, it also
became, quite independently of its power projection attributes, the principal means for
· making and distributing wealth among nations, groups, and individuals. Left to their own
inner logic, however, markets had several severe shortcomings in responding to rising
popular demand around the globe for greater access, ownership, and consumption of goods
and services. As early market critics, both Socialist and non-Socialist, recognized, economic
wealth and political power tend to gravitate toward the few in monopolistic or oligopolistic
control of internal markets. State interest in a competitive edge also leads to a bias in favor of
nationally based industrial and :financial institutions, to the disadvantage of the less endowed,
informed, powerful or privileged. 25 Some form of countervailing power -- largely conceived
as state intervention -- was commonly invoked to right market imbalances as well as to
correct perceived inequities, uneven distribution of wealth, and institutionalized inequality
among states and peoples. As long as these conditions persisted, they generated pressures,
as the Marxist-Leninists predicted, for revolutionary change and, by logical extension, for a
new global political order.26
Keynesian market critics also understood that free markets did not necessarily find a
stable equilibrium at full employment27 External intervention was needed to achieve
acceptable lev~ls of domestic wealth and welfare. The worldwide depression of the 1930s
and the globalization of the nation-state system in the postwar era logically extended the
analysis from domestic welfare to the international political economy. It is now axiomatic
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that a nation's domestic welfare increasingly depends on its competitive performance in
international markets, and governments are expected to nurture· and support natural
competitiveness. The high cost of war today -- witness the Iran-Iraq struggle_.:

also inhibit

reliance on force or threats to skew market rules in a nation's favor, even for a state that may
objectively command greater coercive assets than a militarily weaker but economically
stronger adversary or competitor. This is certainly the case between stalemated nuclear rivals
since numbers count for less in nuclear warfare than between conventionally armed states
The problem facing ·governments is nowadays more daunting than ever before. To
ensure domestic order and welfare they are obliged increasingly to intervene abroad,
unilaterally or in concert, to control the behavior of other states and markets on behalf of their
populations at the very time that state control over international markets, including the
transfor of arms and lethal technologies, has diminished. Central banks' dilemma about
whether and when to intervene in support of key currencies is one example given the
enormous financial resources at the disposal of multi-national corporations and private
groups and individuals. Such dilemmas arise in part from widely perceived legitimate but
often conflicting claims of nation-states and markets. Efficient resource allocation for
economic welfare requires markets, but uncontrolled markets can yield outcomes short of
desirable output levels or politically prevailing standards of wealth, equity or safety (as in
environmental pollution). Specifically, unregulated national or international arms sales can
perturb military and political balances among nation-states, and disrupt harmony among

socio-economic groupings within them.
3. Theoretical Synthesis of State and Market Forces
The mix of strategies pursued by a particular state to relax the dilemmas posed by
competing security and market needs will vary, depending on particular regional and national
circumstances. If the analyst focuses narrowly on the first imperative, and generalizes across
cases to identify system-wide constraints on behavior, states are portrayed as primarily
driven by the security dilemma or the war trap. ·Under these conditions, they are assumed to
be either operating under assumptions of pure anarchy or, at best, as members of a primitive
world society _of states governed by minimal rules of cpnduct and principles of legitimacy.28
Under notions of rigid security requirements, even economic exchange is viewed as a contest
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between states ultimately for preeminence and military superiority. States~ then, are expected
to resort to force or threats to acquire the resources necessary for order and for levels of
material welfare that will ensure or enhance their status.29 Analysts who prefer to
concentrate on techno-economic exchanges, however, tend to assume mutual cooperation and
trust under market condition and, over time, universal access by states to needed resources
and technologies through mutually beneficial exchanges to goods and services.
Any attempt to reduce one set of state imperatives causally to the other stands, as the
discussion below suggests, against logic and experience. Exclusionary perspectives that
restrictively define the systemic determinants of state behavior also run counter to widely
shared notions of political-legitimacy based on the ability of national governments to
discharge their order and welfare functions. Neither facts, logic or norms have prevented
neo-realist theorists, concerned narrowly with the elementary conditions of order, from
defining the market and its implications for power creation and redistribution as .subsidiary to
national military power and diplomacy and outside the boundaries of theoretical concern.
Liberal and Marxist theorists have been correspondingly incapable of incorporating the
development of the territorial state, attached essentially to national and, hence, atavistic or
ideological or community exclusiveness, into their rival interpretations of market oriented
economic development (Liberals) or dependency and liberation (Marxists).30 Theorizing
about international relations and, specifically, about international political economy,
therefore, has been stifled. By the same token, focus on the nation-state blocks theorizing -empirical or normative -- about much of global politics concerned with getting and spending.
To pose the question of order in global terms, Le., as more fundamental than simply that of
accommodating nation-states, is already to be dismissed as visionary and presumably
irrelevant, according to some analysts.31
Theory thus has reached an impasse. Partisans of one. vision or the other -- realist,
Liberal, or Marxist-Leninist (updated by dependencia writers) --.. either speak past each other
or explain only those parts of state and market behavior that suit their empirical and normative
predispositions. The circularity and lack of progress in thinking about political economy is
captured in Robert Gilpin's self-abnegating but thoughtful observation that
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... [L]iberalism, nationalism, and Marxism make different assumptions and· reach
conflicting conclusions regarding the nature and consequences of a world market
economy or (as Marxist prefer) a world capitalist economy . . .

These contrasting

ideologies or perspectives constitute intellectual commitments or acts of faith.
Although particul~ ideas or theories associated With one position or other may be
shown to be false or questionable, these perspectives can be neither proved nor
disproved through logical argument or the presentation of contrary empirical
evidence.32
One way out of the impasse is to include both_ nation-state and global market
assumptions, however conflicting, in political economic theory. Moreover, it is important to
distinguish between currently popular' models of political economy and political economic
theory based on hypotheses about the systemic incentives of global political and economic
systems and on empirical observations that provide a provisional evidentiary foundation to
demonstrate their effect on the behavior of great and small powers. Models and theories
should not be confounded.· Rather than identify a model with a theory, and conduct research
primarily to determine whether state and market behavior fits a particular model's expected
rules,33 it would be more fruitful, as this analysis suggests, to begin with those general and ·
pervasive aims that appear to animate actors -- particularly those associated with military and
techno-economic interests -- and to attempt to explain, partially but critically, political actions
in terms of these organizing or systemic-wide aims which arise as a consequence of the
nation-state system's and market forces. Systemic rationality can be understood, therefore,
as a set of rules (i.e., policies) in disposing and deploymg capabilities that the actor (and not
the analyst) judges will result in a satisfying equilibrium in meeting competing global or
environmental state and market, i.e,.order and welfare, needs.
One place to begin building such-a body of testable propositions about nation-state
and market behavior.is with the making and marketing of arms. __ This sector exposes the
dilemmas of order and welfare more 8-(;utely than most other political-economic domains. It
is not, as has been depicted, a sector of exclusive concern either to the military strategist or to
the economic planner.34 It is prechiely this sector that links the specialized concerns of both
within a comrimn framework of analysis, i.e., the political economy of the state with the
simultaneous globalization of the nation-state system and economic markets. Arms
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production and sales combine both the incentives for behavior derived from command and
coercion with those arising from consent and exchange for mutual benefit
This domain also most clearly reveals the futility of confining analysis to paradigms,
for all their professed rigor, that do not capture the integrally mixed strategies pursued by
holders of material capabilities in ordering their relations. On the strength of patterns· formed
by these mixed strategies, we can begin to develop a more empirically relevant and verifiable
theory of political economic behavior ~er than be led by what might be invidiously
characterized as the three blind mice approach of realist, liberal, and Marxist-Leninist
thinking. At a niliµmum we can train research energies on accurately describing and
explaining what is occurring. Prevailing political-economic models are angular and brittle,
subject to easy breakage with the first shock of contact with fact and reality. If that is the
case, it seems foolish either to go on testing models that cannot deliver on their claims35 or to
assemble impressive data to bolster models flawed on their face. 36

.
II. Evidentiary Basis for a Theory of Making and Marketing Arms
1 . Patterned-Nation State Strategies to Acquire Arms and Promote Domestic Welfare
One or a combination of three alternative strategies ·are open to any state in its efforts

to acquire arms: autonomous national production; collaboration with other states or firms in
developing and transferring arms and know-how; or assistance from other states or off-theshelf purchases through direct payments, credit, or barter. A state's basic security concerns .
and level of economic aspirations will condition choices among these strategies, and among
specific mixes of anp.s. For example, a security strategy premised on forward defense and
maximum operational readiness strategies will dictate a more comprehensive arms policy than
one based on area or continental defense and reliance on the mobilization of reserves and
conversion of the civilian economy for military purposes.37 In capitalist states, a choice also
exists between state and private ownership of the means of arms production. We will
describe the combination of these strategies and production modes for today's main arms producing and marketing states before beginning w generalize about current thinking about
the causes and consequences of producing and exchanging arms and lethal technologies.
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The United States -- The American government continues to rely principally on
private corporations and research institutions to develop and to produce arms by contracting
for, rather than directly owning, the means of production. · The market-plays a dual role in
such a private enterprise-government subsidized system, regulated and sustained by an
elaborate contractual process. For firms, research centers, and universities, the market
supplies the personnel and financial investments and techno-scientific inputs needed to .
sustain a complex industry and outlets for the sale of arms and technology. Unlike other
Western democracies, the American market has been sufficiently large until now to
underwrite the costs of research _and development of major weapons systems and to lower
unit production costs below those of competitors, especially for high performance weapons
such as supersonic aircraft or for sophisticated electronic hardware such as the AWACS
command and control system.
The size of the American market and the large resources at the disposal of the central
government also have permitted Washington to pursue, despite periodic objections from
allies, an essentially autonomous weapons production policy. Until recently, this
circumstance has provided the United States a comparative advantage in the inter-allied and
global arms markets. During the 1960s and 1970s the US enjoyed a favorable balance of
trade within the Atlantic alliance of approximately ten to one (nowadays the ratio is three to
one, another indication of declining US competitiveness), and was the leading Western arms
seller in the developing world. Advanced military technology also made the US an attractive ·
partner in joint projects within NATO. European firms gained access to US technology, and
European treasuries were taxed less in buying high performance weapons than if they had
attempted to develop these arms on their own.38
Therefore, the United- States could, at once, autonomously meet its arms needs -- a
prime (perceived) requirement of nation-state survival, power, and. status -- yet_ dominate
allied arms markets through technological innovation and lower unit costs, as well as through
levered political influence arising from allied dependency on the American security guarantee.
Washington also patterned its global distribution of arms, perhaps more than other.states, on
the basis of its security policies vis .!! vis the USSR; major arms recipients tended to be allies
. and strategically valued clients. As a bonus, American firms could profit commercially from
the global sale of weapons and military technology built on US and allied market sales.
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Through such a process, the F-16 would become not just the standard for NATO, but an
international fighter incorporated into the inventories of such diverse states as Israel,
Pakistan, and Indonesia.39 The American arms industry and, by extension, American
security interests and technological and economic growth could then be supported not only
by national subsidies and purchases but also by world market sales.
The political economy of American arms was consistent with Washington's overall
post-war political-economic strategy, enunciated in alliances and close strategic ties with
partners in Europe, Asta, Latin America, and the Middle East. These regions accounted for
the bulk of US arms and military technology transfers. The creation of the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank and support for General-Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade

(GATT) free trade principles also testified to American open market preferences,

including stable and convertible currencies pegged to the dollar. An expanding capitalist
market was the preferred socio-economic solution to Western and developing world welfare
demands. It was conceived also as an ;mswer to the everlurking socio-~onomic grievances
that were widely believed to spawn political upheaval and authoritarian solutions during the ·
worldwide· depression and protectionism of the 1930s. Thus, by the 1960s, American
leaders assumed they could achieve both autarky in producing arms and effective lethal
technologies and market hegemony in selling them abroad Order and welfare both ·could be
served through an expanding global market and economic interdependence.40 Such ·
assumptions increasingly were subject to doubt, however, as the general US trade position
eroded, as defense costs and budget deficits soared, as procurement scandals broke, and as
global arms markets became saturated by a growing list of suppliers.
The Soviet Union -- Like the United States;the Soviet Union has pursued an
autonomous arms production policy, and has distributed arms primarily to reward and protect
foreign clients.41 In contrast, however, it relied.on a command, not a market, economy to
develop and.procure arms, albeitwith the provision of semi-competitive state supported
research and design institutes for major weapons (e.g., MiG Y§. Antonov vs. Y akovlev vs.
-Tupolev y_s. Ilyushin aircraft). Committed to Socialist principles of state ownership of the
means of production, ·Moscow rejected the Marshall Plan and vetoed East European
participation in the European recovery plan. It correctly reasoned that integration would have
drawn the Soviet Union and its allies into a capitalist market structure under US hegemonic
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leadership. Collaboration with the West in arms making and marketing was precluded.
Non-military areas of economic exchange also were highly restricted and largely confined to
commerce with other Socialist states, partially out of ideological preference and meager
export production of competitive goods, as well as by Cold War trade policies. Trade with
oeveloping states relied significantly on military and heavy equipment exports and barter over
monetary and financial terms of exchange, since flexible capitalist market arrangements were
shunned as exploitative or unavailable (a nonconvertible ruble was a serious impediment). A
billion-dollar Soviet purchase of Moroccan phosphates in exchange for Soviet heavy road
building equipment and technical assistance illustrates a general pattem.42 While barter
arrangements may be viewed as a form of market exchange, they cannot sustain the size,
multiplicity, or complexity of product, service, investment, and financial exchanges implied
by a fully developed market economy.
Whereas the United States has relied on its continental and global markets to generate·
the techno-scientific advances and the economic resources to sustain its weapons industry,
the Soviet Union, following essentially a nationally based and ideologically driven policy of
economic autarky, relied on its weapons industry and large unit demand supplemented by
purchases of Warsaw Pact states, to drive its technological development, to foster its
influence in the Third World, and to gain a competitive advantage in world markets in
military arms sales. With a claim on national investment exceeding any Western state,
including the United States (at least as a proportion of GNP), the Soviet military-industrial
complex demonstrated an ability forinnovation in avionics, space, and special materials. Yet
even in arms development, where the Soviet Union implicitly enjoyed a competitive edge, "it
is almost axiomatic," as many observers recognize, "that each new generation of Western
weapons, computers and aircraft within three to five years will be followed by Soviet
. replicas. "43 The perceived dictates of national security, order, and independence also
subordinated domestic welfare considerations that could presumably have been better served
by entering world markets and by adhering to the liberal trade p~ciples but, clearly, at the
expense of ideological and national power aspirations:

In foregoing the competitive cold bath of the global economy for the sake of the Cold
War, the Soviet Union and its bloc partners accepted, if they did not welcome, or anticipate,
lower rates of economic growth and technological development Also not expected was a
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gradual decline in Soviet techno-military competitiveness, an area where the USSR had
scored remarkable successes, dating from the rapid development of atomic and nuclear
weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles, symbolized by the Sputnik launch of October
1957. Like its Western adversaries, the Soviet Union produced advanced automotive,
aircraft, optics, computer, and space satellites systems, but despite reportedly lower unit
costs these products could not compete commercially in world markets. They were
transferable to East European and, on generous credit terms, to Third World clients
essentially as part of the Soviet Union's security policies and protected economic position
within its spheres of political and strategic influence. Soviet military technology also began
to suffer from lags in high technology electronics, particularly computers, and from delayed
development of synthetic resins and metallurgy, resulting in less maneuverable equipment
and reliable engines. However, what Soviet m?itary equipment has suffered in technological
sophistication continues to be s~mewhat offset by ~lative simplicity and durability of
proven, incrementally improved, and now battle tested (Afghanistan) designs.44
Ironically, then, the Soviet Union's state directed and security oriented industrial
sector and its resultant lagging ability to meet popular welfare needs and to }reep pace
· technologically witb. Western and Asian capitalist states eroded its military superpower status.
An essentially reactive military technology has not generated sufficient levels of innovation
on its own, nor has it enjoyed the synergism associated with open and free techno-scientific
and informational exchange.45 As Paul Dibb has shown in his evaluation of Soviet power,
"The Soviet Union ..... will have to be economically and technologically competitive if it is
to.retain its superpower status in the 21st Century. Gorbachev himself has said that the
future of socialism is at stake. If Gorbachev fails, the .Soviet Union risks falling out of the
ranks of the world's great powers. "46 The Soviet model, no longer attractive to the Soviet
Union itself, has also lost interest to developing states. .
The technological progress of European and Asian states, along with the continuing
American challenge, now appear to have altered fundamentally both Soviet security and
.economic policy. Moscow's cooling relations with North Korea and efforts to establish
economic partnerships with more economically productive Asian states than its Vietnamese
client are examples of a new trend in Soviet political-economic policy. In addition, the
spectacle of French cosmonauts joining their Soviet colleagues; of East German associate
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member status in the West European EUREKA high technology research project, and of
Soviet MiGs on display at Western air shows indicate prospects even for certain types of ·
economic collaboration in military equipment in the coming years, especially as Europe
establishes new organizational structures.47
Glasnost and Perestroika are, then, broad reform strategies to overcome past
impediments to economic growth and, arguably, competitiveness in the continuing qualitative
arms race with the United States and the West. Both address the failings of a command
economy and narrow reliance on nation-state paradigmatic rules of behayior in addressing the
systemic imperatives of welfare and order and of the Soviet state's preferences along both
dimensions. Controlled economic planning and centralized decisionmaking were as much
Soviet responses to perceived threats and efforts to enlarge political-economic influence as
they were purported answers to the shortcomings of capitalism. Not surprisingly, Soviet
domestic ref~ efforts depend simultaneously on projecting a diminished threat to other
states, particularly those on Moscow's European and Asian borders, and on officially
reinterpreting threats to Soviet security and political aims. As one Soviet analyst explained,
in emphasizing the need for new cooperative relation with Western Europe built on the illdefined notion of a "Common European Home,": "The idea derives from an understanding
that the European military confrontation was at once useless and dangerous, and that,
·generally speaking, the danger is not attack, but sliding into a crisis, the development of
ecological problems, and the impossibility bf Soviet integration into the world market as a
consequence of the camp mentality and our self-impoverishment by military expenditures. 1148
The Soviet Union needs the competitive pressures of the world market to stimulate
efficient internal production and services and to make its industries more attractive to foreign
investment. Viewed strictly from a Marxist perspective, there is much truth in Timothy
Luke's conclusion that "The USSR's position demonstrates both the continuing ability of the
capitalist world economy to integrate virtually any economy into its network of production
and the on-going failure of even the most energetic national challenge to transnational capital
to finally break out of the dependency networks imposed upon it in the semi-peripheral mode
of industrialization. 1149 From a strategic, nation-state viewpoint, however, his evaluation of
failure paradoxically may be premature. If the Soviet preferred model of the global political
economy has proven wanting on the dimensions of national and personal welfare and military
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technology, future success in adapting Socialist principles to a global capitalist market may
conceivably supply the Soviet Union with the techno-economic and military capabilities it
lacks today to support its long-term global ambitions.
Soviet planners' recent concern for domestic political and economic reform and for
experimentation with market mechanisms highlights a continued preoccupation with the
Soviet global power position. The absence of serious military objection to the reform
movement, to unilateral military cuts in Soviet forces (e.g. the U.N. speech of Mikhail
Gorbachev announcing reductions of 500,000 troops and 10,000 tanks), and to decreases in
Soviet military spending are prima facie evidence of widespread concern in leadership circles
· that unless the reforms succeed, the Soviet Union may even lose its status as a military
superpower. From this.perspective, welfare goals would still appear to be in the service of
the nation-state. It is by no means certain that the Soviet system and internal state control can
be reconciled with open market rules (e.g., the right of workers to strike and bargain
collectively) or with national diversity (witness the Baltic and Armenian disturbances).
Working through these dilemmas is the ultimate test of the success of Glasnost and
Perestroika.
What is good for the Soviet Union is also good for its East European allies. As each
of these states makes its separate peace with the West and enters into techno-,economic
bargains with Western governments, banks, and firms, Moscow's hold over them inevitably
slips. The narrowly based system of Eastern bloc comparative advantage and division of
labor cannot with_stand exposure to the rigors of the global market One can anticipate a
further gradual shift in power through pluralistic political and economic reform, partially

catalyzed and caused by market mechanisms, to weaken the bureaucratic hold of
governmental and party agencies. However, the convergence of Western and Sovietized
societal modernization may, indeed, still be an optimistic assumption. Given the pace and
effect of current reform efforts in the Soviet Union and the Warsaw bloc, a more plausible
- _case than convergence.is some likely mix of commartd and market elements as the basis for
the longterm development of the Soviet politi~al economy. ·
Western Europe -- In the first generation after World War II, the West European
states lacked the means successfully to pursue either autonomous arms acquisition policies or
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independently defined global political and economic aims. Beset by decolonization and
internal political upheaval, particularly acute in France, and dependent on the US for military
protection and assistance as well as for economic recovery, the West European states were
captured largely within the orbit of an American-directed global political economy. This did
not prevent some, like Britain and France, from attempting to pursue policies of national
arms autarky in conventional and nuclear weapons .. But even these efforts depended heavily
on outside subsidies of various sorts. Aside froin the $17 billion in Marshall Plan aid
received by West European states, France and the United Kingdom were granted,
respectively, over $4 billion and $2 billion in military financial assistance arid materiel in the
first decade after the war.50 At the height of the Jndo..:China war, half of the French military
procurement budget was as~umed by the US treasury.51
Less well known, however, were the substantial contributions of the United States to
· the recovery .and sustenance of the European arms industry. The reconstruction of Europe's
economy was itself an indirect support for the regeneration of national arms industries. The
priority assigned by Marshall Plan assistance to capital investment and to expenditures on
infrastructure development like electric power, laid the basis for Europe's return to the global
arms market place. The Marshall Plan also required the European stat~s to coordinate their
national plans in utilizing aid,52 thus promoting the conception of Europe as an integrated
economic entity. The European Steel and Coal Community, the Common Market, and
Euratom were logical extensions of this process. A united Europe, economically and
politically, was viewed by Washington as essential for.the successful conduct of the Cold
War even at the expense of liberal trading principles with the creation of a regional economic
bloc based on community preference. 53 Less _well publicized as a boost for West European
arms firms were several billions of dollars of U. S. off-shore purchases in the 1950s,
including machine tools, as a response to NATO commitments. France's Dassault, for
example, built 225 fighter aircraft, paid for by US government contracts on behalf of the
French air force. Later copies of these aircraft were sold to India and Israel for_ the benefit of
the French arms industry. The know-how, design, experience, toom,.g materials, and
foreign sales derived from these contracts directly contributed to the development of the
commercially successful Mirage series and to Dassault's emergence as an international
producer of advanced fighter aircraft.54
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The role of the market in European arms development differed from that of either
superpower. Whereas the United States and the Soviet Union could support indigenous and
autonomous weapons industries through national markets, the West European states had to
rely heavily on collaborative attangements to lay the foundation for their arms industries.
The French, purportedly the most nationalistic of _European states, actually entered into more
NATO and bilateral European weapons programs than any other European state in the 1960s
and 1970s, although continuing to compete nationally with certain of these collaborative
projects.55 Inter-European weapons cooperation became a sine qua non for the major
European.arms producers to share R andD costs and to assure sufficient weapons orders
from cooperating states' armed forces. Such purchases also became a significant factor in
commercializing European arms sales worldwide.
US and inter-,allied technology has been transmitted mutually along these
transnational networks or, as in the case of the F-16, as part of the t~nns of sale. As the
European economies prospered and, consequently, their bargaining leverage increased,
NATO states preferred licensed production and access to new technology over
straightforward arms purchases or offset compensations for buying abroad. Strengthening
industrial and technological bases through these exchange agreements -- more barter than
financial arrangements -- was understood as vital in improving competitiveness.56 In codeveloping the Tornado aircraft, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom negotiated a set of
delicately balanced offset arrangements to ensure adequate and equitable levels of work for
their airframe, engine, and electronics firms, despite the higher total cost to the program.
. Rolls Royce licensed German and Italian firms to coprcxluce the RB-119 engine, and
Germany transferred ·some ofits 42.5% developmental share to the United Kingdom in order
to gain London's consent for the purchase of US over British radar for the "European

fighter. "57
Until recently the global mark<?t for arms;has played a far greater role in European
arms production than for the United States. Commercial interests have tended to predominate ·
over security concerns in arms transfers. Among the major European producers, moreover,
.

.

the mix of nation-state and market reliance has varied. At one end is France which, with the
end of the Algerian War and the final liquidation of its overseas empire, adopted a strategic
policy based on nuclear weapons and the subordination-of conventional forces to its nuclear
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strategy.58 To sustain an advanced weapons industry and to equip its conventional forces
through indigenous production, an open door arms sales policy -

ventes tout azimuts -

was pursued to serve· both strategic and techno-economic aims. Through mostof the 1960s
and 1970s, France enjoyed a comparative advantage in the arms trade relative to its European
allies. Its weapons were affordable and battle-tested; Israeli Mirages ruled the skies in the
Six Day War. US preoccupation with the Vietnam War coupled with rising demand for
weapons by the newly independent developing states, especially oil-rich states enjoying
windfall profits from rapidly rising oil prices, spurred France's anns exports. Created was a
global network for arms and military technology transfers, centered in the Ministry of
Defense, and led by a special corps of military engineers, dedicated to making .and,
• increasingly, to marketing anns.
France also profited from the failure of its European allies to contest its aggressive
sales effort The United Kingdom attempted to sustain. an independent and autonomous arms
indqstry after World W arII, developing nuclear weapons and a long-range V-bomber force
comparable to US capabilities in the 1950s.59 However, its relatively shallow and narrow
.economic and techno-scientific base was unable to sustain this effort. The British decision to
base its national strategic policy on .American-derived nuclear delivery systems and to limit
severely its overseas commitments in the decades after Suez, led to a radical change in its
security and economic posture.60 Britain m¢ntained relatively high cost indigenous weapons
production _in ground, naval, and air systems, but progressively consolidated production 'facilities through mergers. In contrast to Gaullist France, London, especially under Labor
governments, delayed expanding production to meet overseas sales markets, but moved to
recoup for lost time with the establishment of the Defence Sales Organisation in the late
1960s, whose mandate was expanded and spurred by successive Thatcher governments. 61
West Germany was precluded from developing nuclear arms. It was also bound by
constitutional and legal restrictions in producing and marketing conventional weapons, as
well as by obligations undertaken by Bonn in entering the Western European Union and
NATO in 1955. West Germany initially conre.ntrated on rebuilding its arms industry through·
allied collaborative accords rather than on filling global market demand t:Qrough exclusively
nationally produced weapons. fu the process, and to circumvent restrictions, the Federal
Republic established Europe's widest network of overseas licensed production agreements. 62

24

Italy's weapons base also was too small in the early postwar period.to challenge France as
Europe's weapons leader. In view of US, British, and French NATO market dominance,
Italian firms concentrated on developing niches in the arms market, particularly iri the Third
World, suited to their capability and to the modest international aspirations of the Italian state.
Apart from specialized shipbuilding, Italy ultimately established, in conjunction with
European Community partners, a considerable stake in high technology systems such as
aircraft and helicopters, and in joint ventures with aspiring Third World producers such as
Brazil. 63 Other European arms manufacturing states, such as Sweden suffered for their
neutral status outside the Western bloc .. Notwithstanding, they persevered for national
defense and economic reasons in developing a wide spectrum of military systems, including
high performance fighter aircraft and artillery (note the billion dollar contract of Sweden's
Bofors with India), to meet the domestic consumption of its armed forces and to exploit
foreign sales.
The basic dilemmas, then, of the European arms economy emerge from a review of
the contrasting strategies pursued by each state in producing weapons. Those in the '1NATO
club" have maintained design ~d production capabilities and access to a joint market for
advanced weapons systems, but at the price of arms dependencies and mutual collaborative
constraints on national discretion in selling arms. Those not in the club have struggled to
remain competitive in high technology systems, and enjoy a somewhat unique, less aligned
appeal in the Third World. 64 France, for one, has tried, some~hat successfully, to obtain
the
benefits of both qualified club membership
and a free-lance l'.()le.
Lately, though, the
.
.
.
.

security environment has shifted again,. making choices among autarky, collaboration, or
foreign supply even more difficult. ·The threat of major power war in Europe has receded,
.

.

intensifying an already growing criticism of military spending and US dominance and
spurring advanced technology programs, like EURE!(A, to meet U.S. and Japanese
competitors. Meanwhile, relatively high unemployment persists amidst slumping Third
World arms sales. Concerns for order arid military security, thus, have taken second place to
concerns about technological competition and welfare. The lure of military production is still
there, but it is likely that strategies chosen will focus more than ever on building Eurotechnology ra~er than on strengthening ties directly to NATO (with its concomitant demands
such as weapon "standardization and interoperability").
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Such decisional problems become even more complicated in view of European
Community pressure for technological modernization in the Single European Act (1992).
Primary defense coordination agencies (NATO, Western European Union) do riot entirely
correspond in membership to the EC, or, in the case of national bureaucracies, they are often
at odds with EC organs (Commission and Parliament). 65 Therefore, defense manufacturing
collaboration is likely to remain an ad hoc affair, and to include partners outside the EC, at
least until the Euro-governance problem is resolved.
Developing states -- It comes as no surprise that developing states' arms production
and sales can be explained in terms of the systemic imperatives also underlying developed ·
states' policies. In addition, developing states have intense needs to obtain and absorb
advanced technology, and are highly sensitive to arms dependencies. Thus, while the mix of
motives and interests shaping their responses to nation-state and the market incentives reflects
their unique circumstances, their reactions are no less directed by the systemic imperatives of
order and w~lfare and their preferred status and influence over outcomes within each
emergent global regime than developed states.
Two flawed conceptual assumptions underlie much of the analysis of Third World
arms production and sales. The first is the often narrow conception of security applied to a
state's arms production capacity. Since there apparently exists no immediate external threat
to Brazilian security, many analysts attribute its arms sales almost exclusively to comme~ial
motivation.66 The analyst discovers, axiomatically, what he assumes that he will find. A

broader systemic understanding of nation-state incentives and rules leads, however, to a
different conclusion. A state's or regime's physical security, while of obvious critical
importance~ is not the sole or even preoccupying security concern. National leaders,
especially of major states, also attend to real and:perceived threats posed by the international
power structure and distribution of capabilities. For aspiring Third World leaders, keeping
pace militarily and technologically with other military powers, and opening economic niches
require harnessing the nation's modernization process itself to the requirements of nation-

state power. 67 That national leaders may l;>e misguided or ill-advised is beside the point
Their images of what is important to them and their states (even in finding employment for
university trained personnel who might otherwise organize political opposition) is what
counts. It is important but hardly decisive for them to be shown that a priority assigned
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military spending may inhibit techno-economic growth. As the behavior of the great powers
and of those, like Brazil and India, aspiring to this status, evidences, state leaders are
concerned about the real and perceived threats and status requirements posed by the structure
of international power and the distribution of capabilities and, conversely, about the ability of
the state to influence the global structure of power in preferred ways as well as to define the
terms and outcomes of those instances of state cooperation and conflict of particular interest
The distinction between general and specific threats also helps to harmonize currently
contrasting explanations of Brazilian, Chinese, Indian, and Israeli arms production and
sales.68 It has been observed, for instance, that the Indian military stln campaigns for the
purchase of high quality foreign weapons even at the expense of the Indian government's
interest in nurturing domestic arms production technology, Indeed, the Indian Defence
Ministry recently has announced plans to increase exports of India's own arms products in
order to~ for the import of needed high technology weapons. China, on the other hand,
appears intent on "reverse engineering," whereby foreign weapon prototypes are replicated,
improved, and exported by domestic production facilities. Thus, China has come to rely on
foreign markets to perfect its new weapons designs. 69 What accounts for these varying arms
acquisition patterns· by ambitious developing states?
Speculation might center on the nature of perceived broad and specific security and
welfare threats and incentives. India, for example, with relatively recent w~ experiences and
recollection of arms supply embargoes in the 1960s, responds heavily to Pakistani and
Chinese armament levels, which in tum are driven by Western arms and technology
transfers. Delhi also exhibits general ambitions for influence in the Indian Ocean and South
Asian theaters as well as concerns about domestic order. To compete with a specific
adversary, and perhaps also because of historical relationships and bureaucratically derived
.,J

delays in domestic arms production, the Indian military evidently trusts and prefers the
purchase of major,-sophisticated.weapons from foreign sources, most especially the Soviet.
· Union.
China also has recent war experience and a generation-long revolutionary tradition of · .
partial weapons autarky, but with unhappy experiences at the hands of traditional arms
suppliers such as the Soviet Union. The role of the Chinese armed forces in arms
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procurement may be far different than that of India, and rather than focussing on a particular
enemy, Beijing evidently responds to a broad range of immediate and long term security
concerns, ranging from a superpower on one border to internal dissent and ethnic unrest in
distant provinces or to distrustful neighbors to the south and west India until recently seems
to have emphasized acquisition of technology primarily to build its own power base and
military readiness; China emerged from relative political isolation to mount a determined
·effort both to develop technologically and to market that technology to others. The full
answer to the intriguing question of what factors explain these contrasting arms acquisition
policies probably resides in more comprehensive analyses of perceived threat by the
· leadership of these states, the differential need for export revenue and technology transfers as
well as widely different resource and funding bases, bureaucratic structures, and historical
expenences.
Clearly, though, as Patrick Morgan's analysis has shown,70 general threats to a
government's sense of proper order can be as compelling as those. associated with a particular
threat to a nation's security in orienting a nation's security policies, associated welfare
strategies, and arms production and import-export policies. It is precisely the growing
military and techno-economic interdependence of states that drives the search for weapons
autonomy in two important senses. On one hand, weapons are insurance against an
uncertain future. If no immediate military or political threat, as such, can be identified, it
does not follow that in the long-run a state will not be directly menaced or, conversely, that it

will always have the means to insulate itself from threats arising from global, regional, or
domestic sources.71 On the other hand, weapons.also can, and are perceived to, generate
short-term benefits for a regime in its bargaining in international or domestic politics, albeit
with probably under-valued opportunity costs, especially to economic development. For
example, Brazil's development of a competitive arms industry, dependent on.global market
access to technology and on the sale of arms and know-how, was already anticipated in
France's post-war reaction to superpower strategic...political andtechno-economic hegemony.
For Brazilian leaders, as for French, it was not simply an issue of seeking autonomy to
· prevent other nations from chocking off "arms supplies in order to get [a state], to alter its
behavior"72__ a key factor explaining the arms policies of developing states according to most
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analysts -- but a matter of gaining autonomy to improve their perceived international status
and bargaining position as well as national welfare and popular support.
The history of Brazil's EMBRAER, its major aircraft industry, underscores this mix
of nation-state and market motives. 73 It was launched through state initiative despite
.discouraging estimates of high risk and opportunity cost in entering an intensely competitive
market dominated by the United States and Europe. EMBRAER, and the Brazilian aircraft
industry generally, were not expected to make a profit, but to lay the basis for Brazil's entry
into advanced technology markets. Economic growth was subordinated to long-term, at least
semi-autonomous development of civilian/military aircraft technology, at the expense of
immediate consumption or potentially more profitable investment areas. EMBRAER's
strategy was keyed to three principles: to master appropriate and extant technological
processes associated with aircraft prciduction; to cooperate with foreign firms (principally US
and Italian) to gain access to needed know-how; and to concentrate on projects which
promised spin-offs beneficial to the aircraft industry and to the Brazilian economy.
Brazil's strategy produced s~veral successful ·aircraft. The Bandeirante was exported
worldwide as a military cargo and civilian transport. The Xingu and Tucano, sold
respectively to France and Britain, provided additional evidence of Brazil's ability to
penetrate the markets even of advanced industrial states. In customizing products to buyer
needs, Brazilians exploited niches in world markets unattractive to major producers.
Successes have spawned three new projects, including Brazil's first exclusively military
aircraft, the AMX, designed with the help of Italy's Aeromachi for ground strike missions.
The Brazilian effort to establish an indigenous but globally viable aeronautics industry
"should not be mistaken," as two analysts observe, "for a civilian enterprise or business
which appeared for economic reasons . . . . It should be more properly understood as an
element of the Brazilian bid for major power ~tatus, part of a long range strategic rationale ..
. . EMBRAER's successes stem from its integrated business strategy that coordinates
necessities and capabilities on commercial, industrial and specially technological levels. Its
technological development is the single most critical element of this strategy . "74
Most ~ther major arms producers in the developing world share Brazil's technoscienti:fic and commercial aspirations to some extent, but would appear, as well, to fit the
I
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more classical model of countries which make arms to support strategic and diplomatic
objectives, and to avoid dependencies. India, concerned about arms embargoes since its
experience with Western suppliers during the 1966 Indo-Pakistani war, has pursued a
somewhat more autarkic and protected arms economy than Brazil's, in- selling arms and
technology abroad. Thus, less than 10 percent of Indian military production has been
exported, while over 90 percent of Brazilian production is aimed at the international market
Because of the difficulties and delays in bringing indigenous Indian equipment on line, as
well as a largely state-run heavy industry somewhat insulated from foreign investment, new
licensing and export oriented policies are designed to facilitate importation of the latest
technologies. India had been able to use its nonaligned status to gain access to both East and
West weapons technology. Its nuclear program has been substantially aided by technical and
material assistance from the United States, Canada, and West Europe; its conventional
weapons and aerospace ind:ustries similarly enjoyed Western help (largely British and
French) and substantial favor from the Soviet Union, which permitted India licenses to coproduce weapons not granted even to Warsaw Pact states.75 Between 1971-85, India held
15 licenses for major arms systems from four states, more than any other state.76
Israel, also concerned about dependency in warfare, has a growing defense industry
owing much to foreign licensing·contracts, especially from France in its early period and the
United States more recently, as well as direct aid from Washington. France's boycott of sales
to Israel in the aftermath of the Six Day War in 1967 subsequently spurred efforts to make
Israel's arms production industry as independent as possible. While in no way mitigating its
dependency on foreign technology, .particularly for key component parts, Israel, like other
the major Third World arms producers, has developed considerable arms autonomy through
barter and·exchange relations with developed and developing states. Arguably the most
immediately vulnerable to security threats of the major arms producers among developing
states, and subject in the past to arms resupply delays (1973), Israel is now ab.le to meet forty
percent of its requirements through domestic mariufacture. In some studies, it had reached
sixth rank by 1986 in arms exports; overtaking Brazil. Its growing autonomy provides it
with a local surge capacity to meet urgent and unforeseen ammunition and spare part needs,
to design weal'°ns unavailable elsewhere, to insulate itself in several key weapons categories
(e.g. tactical missiles) from boycotts and embargoes, and to generate needed foreign
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exchange through exports. Like other arms producers in the southern hemisphere, Israel has
also relaxed costs to its trading position through import substitution policies that lower
balance of payment and reserve deficiencies.77
However, as Third World states enter the big leagues of weapons production and
sales, they become subject to the same market forces which hinder economic growth in the
rest of the industrialii.ed world. In particular, the Israeli arms industry now appears to be
fighting for its 11.{e amidst shrinking world markets (in Israel's case including reduced export
prospects to ~ . Central America, and South Africa), the decline of the dollar's value,
defense budgetary constraints, and rising foreign competition, including suppliers capable of
furnishing materials for Israel's defense needs at cheaper cost than Israeli firms. 78 These
constraints, however, have not precluded Israel from using its defense expenditures and arms
industry to promote domestic welfare through weapons production and exports.79 In any
event, the arms exports of states, such as Israel and China, are seen to enhance their nationstate importance. In the five year period from 1981-1985, China and Israel reportedly
exported, respectively, $6.0 and $ LS billion in constant 1984 dollars in arms. 80 As China's
,

,

missile sales to Iran and Saudi Arabia or Israel's arms supply to South Africa suggest, the
great powers cannot ignore either state if they seek to control the arms trade, regional
conflicts, or military technology. Close attention to both nation-state interests and market
success enhances these developing states' bargaining leverage, although t:4e market can work
to limit their leverage as well.
2. Current Cross-National Patterns of Making and Marketing Arms
Several important implications arise for the global political economy by generalizing
across the behavior and strategies pursued by states in acquiring and selling arms and military
technology. First, neither the paradigm and postulates associated with strategic-diplomatic
nation-state behavior nor with developmental or dependency theories of the market fully
explain the international arms economy. Superpower policies since World War II have
ref,lected both paradigms, as both powers sought autonomy in promoting their preferred
notions of order and welfare. The United States has come closest to achieving its strategic
and political-~onomic goals of national independence in providing for its own arms, of.
maintaining a global security system and, for a generation after World War II, of dominating
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· global markets, the latter circumstance providing the wherewithal to meet military and
domestic welfare needs. Ironically, heavy reliance on military markets, while producing
unprecedented amounts of economic goods and services, also has contributed but by no
means is the sole factor explaining the relative decline in US competitiveness. What one
analyst has aptly characterized as the hegemon's dilemma, the very success of the United
States in promoting a liberal economic regime and the globalization of markets in
guaranteeing the security of this regime has, ironically, and perhaps inevitably, eroded its
hegemonic status.81
The Soviet Union also has achieved a level of weapons autonomy, largely premised
on priorities of security and order ovei: welfare as immediate objectives. It has, however,
sacrificed higher rates of techno-economic growth for itself and. its partners. Reliance on
military capabilities to sustain its superpower claims has created its own dilemma In failing
to avail itself of the efficiencies of the market place in allocating productive investments and
in distributing wealth, Moscow has undermined its Jong:..term military prowess. Indeed,
neither superpower has sufficient military power to imposeits strategic and political
preferences on its adversary, and both have experienced sobering difficulties in the Third
World (viz., the US in Vietnam and the USSR in Afghanistan).
As for their European partners, an eroding US dominance is premised on consent,
rather than command, in the Atlantic community. As Gaullist France's withdrawal from
NATO joint command structure symbolizes, consensual leadership is highly contingent and
narrowly conditional. Put another way, NATO applies only to Europe, not elsewhere; and

a

even in Europe the US does not have free hand. ·If Glasnost and Perestroika are carried to
their logical conclusions, as noted earlier, the Soviet Union's military and economic hold on
its Warsaw pact partners also must inevitably slip and, correspondingly, the legitimacy of ihe
Communist governments in East Europe must inevitably erode, as the reform efforts in
Poland and.Hungary suggest .. Whether either superpower will be able to exploit its
opponent's weakness within its sphere of influence is an open question. What is certain,
however, is that the incentive to capitalize on these opportunities have never been stronger in
the postwar period.
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Correspondingly, incentive for a Euro-wide political economy are growing in both
East and West Autonomy, as a strategic or techno-economic ideal, has proven no less
illusory for Western Europe than for the East In stressing foreign policy harmonization as
well as a unified market and the free flow of capital. goods, technology; and, with
reservations, labor within the Community, the.Single European Act of 1992 reaffirms a
succession of key decisions, dating back to the Marshall Plan, in the construction of a more
closely cooperating (if not fully unified) Europe. In arms production, where security and
welfare constraints conflict, Europeans have been less consistent and more nationally
reserved, an illustration of the fundamental tension between the requirements of national and
market imperatives as well as the competing needs of national security and diplomatic
influence and welfare~ Dependency on the United States for security and on arms
development has impeded a European arms strategy to complement the evolution of the
European Community. European governments' wavering choice between the US and other
European states in weapons collaboration and purchases underlines the point that, singly or
in combination, European states are only semi-independent or, alternatively, increasingly
interdependent in weapons development.
West Europeans have relied heavily on collaboration to sustain their militaryindustrial-scientific-technological systems (MISTS). Foreign support is sought not only for
specific weapons projects but also for national organizational structures themselves and for
their continuing technological advancement These organizational structures, while
indigenously based, depend critically on external technological know-how and on guaranteed
markets among collaborating states. The cost of weapons research and development and the
high unit costs of exclusively national production, in the absence of available global
marketing outlets, generate strong incentives to cooperate. This is so despite inevitably
higher ·average costs of multinational versus national programs. 82 Thus, the market drives a
major portion of Euro-defense production, although individual states seek general political
autonomy in arms production as well.
A critical test of Community integration will be the degree that meinbers coordinate
their overlapping and partially conflicting national arms production strategies. Political costs
in eliminating ·multinational collaboration have not escaped the attention of national MIST.
leaders, as they are under increasing pressure to relax their innate opposition to any.
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weakening of national control. Foreign dependency on cross-national arrangements and
market dynamics are traded for greater domestic bureaucratic autonomy -- and political
survival. 83 At the same time, however, spirited sales competition among European suppliers
is still the norm in their dealings with Third World customers. 84
The Janus-quality .of Western allied security and techno-economic relations in making
and marketing arms -- ostensible autonomy paralleled by operational interdependence and
only partial independence -- is reflected in composition of European missile projects since
World War II. As Table 2 indicates, the number of exclusively national programs has not
appreciably increased in over forty years, hovering between a low of 15 between 1946-59
and a high of 18 between 1970-79. Meanwhile, foreign participation in the.form ofmajor
sub-systems from a foreign supplier or formal international programs, has increased
discernibly in each period, rising steadily from six in the first period to 31 between 1980 and
1987. Initially, these collaborative arrangements were exclusively between the US and
NATO Europe. They subsequently enlarged to include solely NATO European projects (e.g.
Franco-German cooperation in Euromissile), and by the 1980s, Third World states were as
active as the US in European missile projects. Thus, arms production follows a general
international economic pattern in which assembly increasingly takes place multinationally.
Here the search for markets and response to offset demands combine with cheaper wage rates
and regional security interests in parcelling out the work load.
The developing world's dependence on arms and military technology from the
developed world is obviously even more acute than the relationship between West Europe
and the United States. On the other hand, Third ·world states are increasingly unwilling to
purchase arms outright Neither the pursuit of nation-state nor market autonomy are well
served by so one-sided a dependency.. in creating indigenous MISTs, developing states rely
on devices similar to those employed by developed states -- licenses, offsets, counter-trade,
coproduction agreements, and sub-contracts. Between 1971 andl985,_ a SIPRI study cites
90 license agreements involving 21 nations. 85 These ·accords tran.smit know-how among
states and form an intricate webbing of MIST relations. Such a structure can be conceived as
progressively independent of the national state settings which initially created and sustained
them. Within their national settings, MISTs represent the most advanced and some of the best funded elements of national modernization efforts. Like their counterparts in the

Table2

EUROPEAN MISSILE PROJECTS
1946-59

1960-69

1970-79

1980-87

National
Projects

15

19

18

16

Foreign
Participation*

6

11

21

31

30

39

47

10TAL

*Major sub-system from aforeign supplier, or formalintemational program.

Source: Rand Corporation Report, 1988.

34

developed states, they are staffed by the "best and brightest" scientific, technical, and military
personnel, with access to the highest levels of governmental influence.
The strategies pursued by developing states in building their military technological
and scientific base and in acquiring know-how from abroad have paid dividends. By the
mid-1980s, 52 LDCs were capable at some level of military production. Compared to the
period between 1960 and 1980, this enhanced capability is remarkable.86 In 1960, seven
states were able to produce 15 aircraft models; twenty years later, the ratio stood at 18 to 67.
Similar trends are discernib~e for naval vessels, ground equipment, and tactical missiles.
Parallel with the growth of MISTs in the developing world, though due mostly to imports,
these states' arms inventories also have grown in size and sophistication. In 1950, almost no
LDC possessed advanced military systems. By 1985, 55 states had acquired supersonic
aircraft; 71, tactical missiles; 107, armored fighting vehicles; and 81, modem warships.87
This progress should not obscure the two-tier techno-scientific hierarchy that has
crystallized between the developed and the developing world.· The superpowers and the
West European states have been able to maintain their lead in developing big ticket, advanced
military systems. These include all forms of nuclear strategic systems, including platforms
and launch vehicles. The diverse airframe, jet engine, and electronics technologies associated
with modem fighter aircraft also escape the capabilities of most developing states, and even

tax the resources of developed states, as in Europe. Between 1977 and 1983, the United·
States annually expended approximately three times more than the European Community
states on military Rand D. 88 The developing states are hopelessly outspent in this area, and
will have to rely for some time on external technology transfers to remain competitive. In
the case of Brazil's aircraft industry or Israel's.Gabriel sea-to-sea missile (over $1 billion in
orders by 1986),89 marketing success is attributable to exploitation of market segments .
overlooked or neglected by developed .states. In addition to -specialized designs, as for desert
,

,

warfare, Brazilhas utilized a ''keepitsimple, keep it cheap" approach to its infantry
equipment
While this techno-scieiltific hierarchy and relative shares of the global arms market
seem likely to persist for the foreseeable future, 90 the lethality of developing states' weapons,
and their impact on regional conflicts, should not be underestimated. Nor should their
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increasing technical ability to develop nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, or to
reproduce and expand upon other states' weapon designs be dismissed as unimportant.9 1
There is no clear and automatic correspondence between the economic and strategic value and
significance of a state's arms exports. The international conference held in Paris in early 1989
on chemical weapons, highlighted by the U.S. diplomatic offensive against a Libyan
chemical plant and German technical assistance in its construction, underscored the widening.
production and transfer capabilities of developing states in lethaftechnologies and
substances. At the same time, depending upon the global debt ·situation, high price tags on
many advanced weapon systems could cut, at least periodically, either the number of
weapons transferred or the total value of sales by major powers in Third World markets.
As the costs of supporting MISTS and national arms production have risen, most
arms producers have increasingly emphasized the commercialization of their arms, services,
and know-how to sustain their national efforts~ Despite somewhat shrinking international
markets, this trend has been unabated in the 1980s. The Reagan administration repudiated
Carter era restrictions on US military sales, and shifted sales away from government
initiatives 111 two ways. First, sales greater than $100 million no longer must be negotiated
officially through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) system. This means that while sales
volume increased, transactions were handled increasingly on an industry-to-industry, or
industry-to-government basis rather than through Pentagon (and potentially resistant
Congressional) channels. Between 1982 and 1988, FMS sales, largely attributable to three
major contracts of F-16s to Belgium, F-18s to Spain, and Trident to the Britain, fell from 72
percent of the total of arms sales to 52 percent.92 Second, this shift to industrial initiative has
also assisted in increasing sales of subsystems and components rather than complete weapon
systems.
West European governments also have pursued more aggressive arms
commercialization.. France, Europe's leader.in "banalizing" the.sale of miliuuy equipment
and technology, did not slacken its pace under the Socialist government of Fran~is
Mitterrand, although the Socialists had campaigned on a platform of "moralizing" arms sales.
Even as President Mitterrand was being inaugurated, the Saudi government was being
assured through the good offices of the President's brother, an Air Force general, that arms
contracts with Riyadh would be honored.93 Charles Hernu, the first Socialist Minister of
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Defense of the Fifth Republic, reaffirmed his commitment to global arms marketing and use
of the arms industry to promote fuU employment and to spur France's technological
development
People forget that the defense minister is not only responsible for military
personnel. Out of720,000 people who work for the Defense Ministry, there are
143,000 civilians and 90,000 arsenal workers. In addition, there are the
armaments enterprises [Aerospatiale], Thomson-CSF, Dassault, Renault ...
Panhard ... [which] employ 300,000 workers and ~ngineers. As for
subcontracting, do you know how many it employs? One million!. ..
I would like to remind you of the arms industries' contribution to
research. Do you know that we are the envy of the Americans in the sphere of
lasers, carbon fibers, and the detection of submarines and nuclear weapons?94
France's principal European competitors - •Britain~ West Germany, and Italy -likewise have relaxed previous governmental controls on arms export.95 The British of
Defence Ministry has been encouraged to follow the French example, and succeeded richly in
1988 with a multibillion dollar Saudi contract for Tornado aircraft and other advanced
military systems.96 In 1985, the United Kingdom booked $6.5 billion in new arms orders,
dwarfing all other Western states, including the United States.97 Since 1982, the West
German government has eased its arms ex.port restrictions, so that no major West European
arms supplier any longer formally bans sales to regions at war or where tensions are high and
volatile.98 All, with France in the lead, have supplied arms and equipmenno parties on both
sides of the Iran-Iraq war. Despite continued.legal controls or restrictions, and with renewed
promises to enforce them, sales now extend to chemical weapons and the construction of
plants around the world capable of building them.

· In··three· of the. eight years between 1978-and 1985, the four major West European
states have delivered in value more arms and have signed contracts for more arms exports
than the United States.99 In 1984, as Brzoska and Ohlson report, France exported 50
percent of its arms production; Britain, 42 percent; West Germany, 20 percent; and Italy, 70
percent.1 00 Now smaller Europeans producers are·entenng global arms markets. Spain
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delivered arms to 37 developing countries between 1970 and 1986, and the Netherlands has
contracts with 22.101
Less visible, but at least as significant in monetary and lethal value, are Soviet and
Warsaw Pact arms and technology sales. If strategic and political imperatives still are the
principal East bloc arms transfer motives, an increasing demand for foreign exchange
currency is, as one recent study concludes, "incontestably the most important economic
factor explaining SoVIet arms sales. "102

A 1982 CIA report concludes that over 85 percent of

Soviet arms deliveries in the 1980s have been paid in hard currency, a rise from around 50
percent in the early 1970s. 103 Arms sales provide Moscow more hard currency than gold
I

exports, and about 40 percent as much as the sale of oil and natural gas. Between 1981 and
1986, the value of Soviet arms deliveries to the Third World averaged $16-17 billion in
constant 1987 dollars, or approximately 40 percent of all supplier sales to 1:he developing
world. 104 East European regimes, principally Czechoslovakia and Poland, accounted for an
additional $3 billion during this period. 105 The East bloc's 40-50 percent share of the Third
· World arms market does not appear to be as immediately threatened as that of th~ Western
states. Whereas orders lagged for the latter group of states· -- down by approximately 50
percent to a low of $12 billion in constant 1987 dollars. for 1986 and 1987 the Soviet Union,
generally offering better credit terms, actually increased its market share in these two
years. 106
The developing world also has stepped up commercial sales efforts. Until now, they
. have not been able to break the hold over the world arms market held by the developed states.
A SIPRI study calculates that these states accounted for only 3 percent of sales in the period
1980-84. 107 A figure between five and nine percent appears to be closer to the mark. US
government figures note that between 1980 and 1987, China alone controlled 3.75 percent of

all sales contracts and about 3 percent of all deliveries. It also broke with prevailing arms
supplier restraints,:m-selling medium-range. missiles to .Iran and.Saudi Arabia, suggesting an
aggressive sales promotion policy as well as a determination to become a major military
power and, by that token, an alternate arms supplier to the developing world in the next
century. In the 1980s, China ranked fifth in arms deliveries and agreements. 108 As noted,
states such as Brazil and Israel also have captured important comers of the market, what the
French prefer to call creneaux. They are not likely to abandon their commercialization efforts ·
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in the future since they are integral parts of their long-term trade and security strategies. An
elusive autonomy may be the long-run airri and rationalization of their arms sales policies;
enhancing national power, balance of payments, and employment is the short-tum marginal
motive, not unlike the pattern of larger suppliers.
Not surprisingly, the increased commercialization of arms sales and military knowhow has reinforced a trend toward the multi.lateralization of arms supplies. One_ can define
supplier relationships as sole, dominant, or multiple according to whether a supplier
furnished over 96, 55-95, or less than 55 percent of the arms to another state. Since the
1960s, the height of the decolonization period, there has been a discernible. shift toward
multiple supplier, and away from sole or dominant, relationships. In two time periods, 196473 and 1976-80, sole supplier dyads dropped from 26 to 16 states (most confined to the
Communist bloc), and from 61 to 49 in the dominant grouping._ In the same periods, multiple
supplier relationships rose from 29 out ofl32 recipient states to 62 out of 142 states. 109 The
combined superpower share of the developing world market felLfrom over 80 percent
between 1966-75 to less than 70 percent thereafter, reaching its lowest ebb in 1984 at less than
54 percent Thanks to a 10 percent rise in Soviet market share deliveries between 1985 and
1987, the superpower share rose to 72 percent in 1987,110 but it is not at all clear, in light of
high costs and worries about high technology transfers, that this level can be sustained. In
any case, supplier duopoly has given way ineluctably to oligopoly.
Conclusion
The behavior of states in making and marketing arms does not square either with the
explanatory power of narrow realist assumptions or those of market theorists. States are
acutely aware that their bargaining power depends on their acquisition of arms and lethal
technologies and on their capacity for indigenous production of implements of war. They are
no less aware of the increasing problematic utility of these weapons as a function of this very
diffusion of arms and arms production capabilities throughout the international system.
Similarly, they are alert to the dilemma posed by the constraints of command economies or
practices in controlling markets with respect to the efficient and effective production of goods
and services .. No less are they aware -- witness Soviet reform efforts -- of the relentless
process of redistribution of techno-scientific and economic capabilities by market
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mechanisms among states, capabilities which are the basis for military power, the bargaining
lever traditionally used by states to shape international environment to suit their preferred
conceptions of order and now to meet their welfare needs.
A realist theory of international relations falls short of explaining the politicaleconomic policies of arms producing and Selling practices of developed or developing states.
To be relevant again, this traditional approach must incorporate a theory of the market, driven
by order and welfare imperatives, into its order and pow~r considerations. The very
distribution of modem weapons and their diffusion to states around the globe and even to
non-governmental bodies enlarge the scope of state bargaining over differences associated
with order and welfare issues. Military force or the threat to resort to violence still frames
negotiations but more as a deterrent, precluding .easy resort to this traditional arbiter, than as a
mechanism within the easy reach of states to impose their preferences of adversaries and,
faute de mieux, even allies who cannot otherwise protect themselves against a common
opponent.

a

Since state'slong-term power and its capacity to meetinternal welfare demands
depend increasingly on its competitiveness in world markets, the terms of economic
exchange are then essentially transformed into a power struggle no less decisive in the longrun in defining the hierarchy of states than tests of battle. Techno-economic conflict becomes
a surrogate for war viewed as politics by other means, while high technology becomes the
·-

.

hope for economic revitalization as well (viz., Europe in 1992). This struggle goes beyond
the mere use of economic capabilities for political ends, what is currently understood as
economic statecraft Welfare now.refers to a state's very techno-econon:iic strength and its
ability to meet its population's welfare needs as well as the challenges (military and
economic) ofother states. Just as the destructive nature of modern weapons shifts the
bargaining process to the manipulation of threats and the definition of inevitably tenuous
arms control arrangements (since an exchange of hostilities is too costly) so also the technoeconomic conflict proceeds increasingly in pursuit of some agreed upon rules of market
behavior to insure tolerable levels of international order and welfare, judged acceptable and
legitimate both by national governments and their populations.
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Once theory building is.based on the mixed motives of order and welfare, the
challenging task of measuring the variable impact of these imperatives on the aims and the
strategies of specific states can be pursued without excluding either systemic factor from
consideration. 111 A better understanding of the strategic and economic priorities explaining
state behavior is a precondition for contriving or engineering acceptable adjustments among
states to meet their competing security and welfare aims and interests. These adjustments
will ha,ve to be made as a consequence of nation-state compromises or as the accepted
outcome of market forces, ratified by national leaders and their populations. The hegemonic
solutions of order and welfare, imposed by the superpowers on their clients and allies in the
postwar period either by force or consensually accepted by them for lack of feasible
alternatives, now recede progressively in force and attractiveness, even to the superpower
themselves.
This latter circumstance can be partially explained itself as the gradual adjustment of
the superpowers to the diffusion of military and economic capabilities in the world
environment. 112 What is not clear is whether this incessant adjustment process can be
contained at a level of order below the eruption of potentially catastrophic hostilities and yet
be responsive either to demands for greater measures of welfare by populations everywhere
or to associated calls for more democratization (e.g. China) .. The ceaseless pursuit of making
and marketing arms and lethal technologies raises, not resolves, these uncertainties. But if
progress is to be made either in explaining state behavior or in fashioning policy instruments
to regulate the struggle for power and welfare, realists assumptions that differentiate the
theory of the state from the market as well as order from welfare will have to be revised to
integrate these domains within a common conceptual framework. The domain of making and
marketing arms, as the discussion above suggests, is a useful laboratory to delineate the
properties of sound theory building and relevant policymaking viewed both from a national
and from an international perspective.

--------------·--------------------------------------------------------------
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